Bottom Up vs. Top Down: ICANN’s At Large in Internet Governance

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MIND #2
Internet Policy Making
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Responses - Stakeholder Civil Society

Olivier M. J. Crépin-Leblond, ICANN ALAC

Abstract
Rather than simply swapping the traditional Westphalian System for a multistakeholder model, Civil Society and Governments should engage in a dialogue where a bottom-up process is interfacing with the rigid top-down decision process of Governments.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1 Bottom Up Vs. Top Down: ICANN'S At Large in Internet Governance

Bottom Up Vs. Top Down: ICANN'S At Large in Internet Governance

Bertrand de La Chapelle’s [BDC11] article about Multistakeholder Governance addresses many points, ranging from the limits of the Westphalian system of democracy to the lessons learnt from the principles and practices of ICANN and the IGF, while also touching on implementation pitfalls.

We are currently witnessing a true paradigm shift. And this shift is, at times, confrontational, in that the multistakeholder Internet has become a very strong political force through the catalytic effect it has had on social networking, the very force behind multistakeholder governance. Internet social networking has proved very good at adapting to situations, and demonstrated great resilience. But rather than focussing on the strength of the Internet’s political force, let us look at several challenges which a multistakeholder system of democracy would face, and which BDC11 has touched on.

My analysis is based on the experience I have gathered in my current volunteer position as Chair of the At- Large Advisory Committee (ALAC). The ALAC is a 15 member committee which acts on behalf of the wider At-Large community which is divided in 5 Regional At-Large Organisations (RALOs). The At-Large community of ICANN endeavors to act in the best interests of the 2.1 billion Internet users. The ALAC can comment on everything and anything ICANN-related. It can provide advice directly to the ICANN Board. At-Large members can take part in cross-community working groups. Under certain conditions, the ALAC can also comment on external proceedings which might affect ICANN and, if so, would also affect Internet users in the broader sense. The mode of governance in At-Large is purely bottom-up and involves collecting the thoughts “at the edge” and promoting input from the grassroots. It is a microcosm of a multistakeholder bottom-up model nested in the wider multistakeholder organization that ICANN is. It is an experiment within an experi- ment that operates in the real world, a prototype in multistakeholder policy-making with the potential to affect millions of Internet users worldwide. With its sphere of responsibility as a part of ICANN, the At-Large community is faced with all of the challenges which BDC11 describes, and more!

The Essentials

Whilst a multistakeholder system of governance might appear to be a panacea for governance in an increasingly complex world, it is not without its real challenges and quirks. There are two main ingredi- ents to keep track of.

Communication Is The Key

None of the bottom-up multistakeholder models of governance would be possible without ubiquitous telecommunications. This circumstance is an essential catalyst as regards effective participation. Telecommunications have been the key enabler of effective bottom-up multistakeholder models of governance. As a result, the public defence of omnipresent telecommunications constituted by a user-centric Internet and easily accessible and open mobile communications is of paramount importance. Without that freedom, this tool for democracy can be turned to tools for capture and a possible descent into a world run by despotic, non-democratic regimes. Without telecommunications, global outreach would be impos- sible, or at least seriously hindered. This is noticeable in At-Large, where participants from countries with less than satisfactory telecommunications are hindered from presenting their ideas to participants elsewhere.

Knowing The Limits Of Working With Volunteers

Working with volunteers has its own challenges. On paper, once a list of volunteers is established, it is assumed that these volunteers will all participate to perpetuity in the same manner and to the same extent. But this is never the case. Most volunteers have a life that will always take precedence over their volunteering activity, whether it is their private life, or their work. As a result, volunteers often have limited time availability, need to be reimbursed with any expenses directly incurred by their volunteer activities and cannot be motivated by the traditional carrot (monetary incentive of a job) and stick (the threat of being fired) method. As Brafman and Beckstrom [BB06] explain in their book, The Starfish and the Spider, volunteers work out of the conviction that their work is useful and will benefit the whole organisation. Volunteer work is based on a system of recognition comprising a mix of social recognition, ideology, a sense of personal achievement and passion on the part volunteers. But as mentioned above, this system has its limits. Key volunteers will sometimes be unavailable to work at the most crucial moment of a project’s timeline. Volunteers will begin project work eagerly but drag their feet after a while as the novelty factor wears off. Volunteers will more likely be abundant in “fun” projects and sparse in more complex cumbersome ones. A big danger in volunteer organisations is also that volunteers will occasionally suffer from burn-out. Ironically, it will often be the most active volunteers who risk burn-out, thus leaving a void in the multistakeholder process. A volunteer organisation is a very complex ecosystem in itself: strong yet very fragile.

The Grain Of Sand

The above challenges relating to volunteers have the potential to very quickly throw grain of sand into the cogs of the theoretical aims explained by BDC11:

“3.1 Ensuring really inclusive participation”, does not only mean ensuring it at the beginning of a project, but throughout that project’s life. But as a result of differing skill-sets, knowledge, or even cultural backgrounds, this can be very difficult to achieve. Some cultures are more inclined to be outspoken than oth- ers. Working methods differ greatly. Misunderstand- ings between cultures are commonplace. Global governance has brought back the Tower of Babel. And then there is the undeniable fact that the earth is round, which means that for participants from some regions, involvement is more difficult due to the anti- social conference call hours they are subjected to.

“3.2 Fighting information overload” is the major reason for burn-out among volunteers. It is therefore vitally important to find a system to classify that information, channel it and manage it.

“3.4 Preventing capture”, is jeopardised as soon as volunteers start dropping off due to burn-out or to a hostile working environment. Employees might remain at work in a hostile environment but only the most masochists of volunteers will stay. Capture is therefore a possible consequence of a hostile environment. For that reason, it is important to make the work environment as agreeable as possible at all times.

“3.5 Composing diversified groups” is immediately affected when volunteers drop out of action. Any unresolved drop-out has the potential to leave a void in terms of the group’s diversity.

But perhaps the most complex of challenges in volunteer-based bottom-up work is the notion of “The neutrality of Steering Groups” explained in BDC11’s Section 3.6. As mentioned earlier, an element of ideology and passion is required in volunteers for them to take part in bottom-up governance processes which are as demanding as the ICANN processes. How is it then possible to ensure that volunteer dedication to the cause or task on the table is fully motivated by the overwhelming will to do “good” by all actors, in other words, by the common will to act in the public interest? Debates amongst volunteers at ICANN question the notion of the “public interest”. What is the “public interest”? What if the volunteer actors of a multistakeholder system were to act in their own personal interest? How would this be detected? How would this affect the neutrality of Steering Groups?

ICANN is often the target of harsh criticism and claims that steering groups are not neutral and that actors in the ICANN ecosystem are more inclined to act for their own interest than the public interest. This will no doubt need to be addressed during the continuous improvement process which BDC11 refers to in his section 2.9.

Final Compensation

Of course, one way of easing the ability of volunteers to spend more time working in the organisation is to bring incentives into the equation. Financial compen- sation for volunteer time is a possible option, and one that would relieve some volunteers of their concerns about the effect on their livelihood of dedicating time to non-paid activities instead of to paid work. This would be especially important for volunteers taking on positions of responsibility which, by definition, require a high proportion of their time. But then, when does a volunteer stop being a volunteer (non- paid) and start being an employee (paid)? Does the main criterion for a volunteer’s involvement in a bottom-up system, “ideology”, risk being replaced by the notion of a “career”? Many are therefore vehemently opposed to the idea, even amongst the volunteers that make up the At-Large community.

Conclusion

Rather than engaging in a paradigm shift involving swapping a traditional Westphalian System with a pure bottom-up multistakeholder model in the manner one flicks a switch, the path might lie, at least in the short term, in introducing the bottom-up multistakeholder model on a step by step basis, the aim being to constitute a merged hybrid system. BB06 also pointed towards this path for commercial organisations. Civil society and governments should engage in a dialogue where a bottom-up process interfaces with the rigid top-down decision-making process of governments. Rather than risking a head-on collision, such dialogue would encourage those involved to focus on reducing friction by defending the line that both groups are acting in the “public interest”. Perhaps this is where the answer lies: the bottom-up multistakeholder process shining a light of transparency on government processes, forcing accountability at all levels of government, and with the governments themselves providing catalysis, reach, competence, support and a framework for the bottom-up multistakeholder model to thrive in.